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AbstrAct
Since its inception, ACT has placed a significant emphasis on the use of self-based 
techniques, and the self was defined initially through the three selves (i.e., self as content, 
self as process, and self as context). In addition, RFT provided a more technical account 
of self in terms of the deictic relational frames. However, the overlap between ACT’s 
mid-level terms (e.g., self as context) and RFT’s derived relations has been the subject of 
limited empirical scrutiny. The current study investigated the relative utility of manipulating 
distinction deictic versus hierarchical deictic relations in a self as context exercise designed 
to reduce experimentally induced emotional distress. The findings demonstrated superiority 
of the intervention that focused on hierarchical, rather than distinction, deictic relations in 
terms of reducing distress. The implications of the data for the potential overlap between 
ACT and RFT are discussed.
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Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) places a significant emphasis on the 
use of self-based techniques (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999), often with the therapeutic 
aim of facilitating ‘self as context’. Self as context is one of the ‘three selves’ (along 
with ‘self as content’ and ‘self as process’; see Hayes, 1995), a multi-dimensional non-
technical (i.e., middle level) concept ACT employs to refer to the broad term ‘self’. 
In short, ACT employs specific therapeutic techniques (e.g., the observer exercise) to 
move clients away from self as content and towards self as process and ultimately self 
as context. In doing so, the therapist attempts to reduce the hold that psychological 
content exerts over a client’s sense of self. Specifically, in self as content, the client’s 
thoughts, feelings etc. are easily attached to her perspective, hence compromising her 
broader sense of self and strongly influencing her behavior. In contrast, self as process 
and context are designed to reduce this hold, thus separating the self from the content. 
The result is a more secure sense of self which promotes psychological and behavioral 
flexibility, and values-oriented behavior. 
Although there is sound outcome data to suggest that ACT, when comprising 
self-based techniques, is effective in achieving its therapeutic aims (Hayes, Luoma, 
Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006; Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, & Hayes, 2012), two clear 
gaps are present in the relevant literature. First, there is little or no published evidence 
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demonstrating that these techniques are active ingredients in these outcomes. Second, 
the concept of the three selves is a middle level term and thus does not yield readily 
to functional analysis. Given that self is argued to play such a pivotal role in ACT, this 
is something of a weak scientific position for that therapeutic paradigm.
Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001) has 
been suggested as a solution to a number of middle level term problems inherent in 
the language of ACT, and self is the most obvious of these (Luciano, Valdivia-Salas, 
& Ruiz, 2012). In short, RFT appears to offer a functional contextual account of the 
behavioral and verbal processes that define a sense of self (Barnes, Stewart, Dymond, 
& Roche, 2000). The RFT definition of self relies on three core deictic or perspective-
taking relations, known as I-YOU, HERE-THERE, and NOW-THEN; and a sizeable 
body of empirical evidence supports this definition and its various predictions (e.g., 
McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2004; McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes, Whelan, & Stewart, 2007).
Much of the empirical evidence regarding the deictic relations has involved 
various adaptations of the same relational protocol (based on Barnes-Holmes, 2001) 
and has been developmental in nature. For example, McHugh et al. (2004) investigated 
a developmental age-based profile with regard to deictic relation type and relational 
complexity. Furthermore, Rehfeldt, Dillen, Ziomek, and Kowalchuk (2007) used the 
protocol for assessment purposes with a sample of children with autism. More recent 
studies have also begun to explore clinical applications of the deictic protocol, for 
example, by exploring potential deictic deficits with individuals with schizophrenia 
(Villatte, Monestès, McHugh, Freixa, & Loas, 2010). 
Only one published study has investigated the way in which deictic relations 
may be altered using ACT-based techniques, such as defusion and self as context (i.e., 
Luciano, Ruiz, Vizcaíno-Torres, Sánchez-Martín, Gutiérrez-Martínez, & López-López, 
2011). In their ‘defusion I’ condition, these researchers attempted to facilitate defusion or 
separation between the self and content with adolescents at high or low risk of conduct 
difficulties. For example, participants in the defusion I intervention were instructed to 
“Just contemplate your thought as if you were contemplating a painting”. With a similar 
but naïve sample, their ‘defusion II’ condition employed a more extensive protocol 
of ACT-based techniques that specifically attempted to establish hierarchical relations 
between the self and the content (e.g., “Imagine yourself so big as to have room for 
all of the thoughts you have had today”). The findings indicated superiority on a range 
of measures of clinical improvement (including reductions in problem behavior) for 
defusion II over defusion I. In short, it was more beneficial for the participants to learn 
to adopt a hierarchical perspective with regard to their content, rather than a simply 
distinct perspective. These outcomes not only provided insight into the middle level 
concept of defusion, but illustrated its potential overlap with the deictic relations and self. 
Because both are middle level terms, it is very difficult in ACT to distinguish 
defusion from self as context techniques. For example, Luciano et al’. (2011) defusion 
research protocols I and II could readily be described as containing self as context 
techniques and both place heavy emphasis on the deictic relations. In other words, one 
might describe their defusion I protocol as distinction deictics and their defusion II 
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protocol as hierarchical deictics. The current research attempted to extend the original 
research by Luciano et al. and to explore further the potential role of the deictic relations 
in self as context techniques.
The present study attempted to modify Luciano et al.’s (2011) interventions by 
specifically targeting distinction versus hierarchical deictic relations. The term preferred 
for the brief protocols employed here is self as context rather than defusion to emphasize 
that the interventions were heavily focused on the self. The following examples illustrate 
the difference between deictic distinction versus deictic hierarchical relations. Consider 
the common ACT leaves on a moving stream exercise in which clients are instructed 
to: “Notice that you are here and your thoughts are there on a leaf floating down the 
stream”. The deictic relations of YOU and HERE-THERE are explicitly stated, but 
the distinction relation between you and your thoughts via the HERE-THERE relation 
is implicit (i.e., YOU are here is distinct from your thoughts there). Now consider an 
instruction from the Observer Exercise: “You are not just your body, your roles, your 
emotions, your thoughts. These things are the content of your life, while you are the 
arena, the context, the space in which they unfold”. Again, the deictic YOU is explicitly 
stated, but in this case the relation between you and your content is clearly hierarchical 
(i.e., you are the context in which your thoughts exist).
The current study employed two brief self as context interventions with a non-
clinical sample of undergraduates, asked to generate a negative self-criticism. The 
interventions were abbreviations of those developed by Luciano et al. (2011), but one 
more explicitly emphasized the distinction between self and content, while the other 
emphasized a hierarchical relation between these. Specifically, we investigated the 
relative impact of these two manipulations on levels of discomfort, anxiety, and stress 
associated with the self-criticism.
Method
Participants
Forty-four naïve adults participated in the current study. All were undergraduate 
or postgraduate students at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth (NUIM). A 
screening measure was employed to exclude any potential participant who reported a 
history of psychological distress. This yielded a final sample of 36 participants (14 
males and 22 females), aged between 18 and 21 (M= 19.78 years). Participants were 
allocated randomly across two conditions denoted as distinction self as context (N= 18) 
and hierarchical self as context (N= 18).
Setting and Materials
All aspects of the study were conducted in an Experimental Room at NUIM. 
Two explicit measures were employed: an Experimental Screening Questionnaire (ESQ, 
developed for current purposes); and the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-
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II; Bond et al., 2011). Two sets of rating scales were also employed: Visual Analog 
Scales (VASs) were used as distress ratings and assessed discomfort, anxiety, and stress 
associated with the experimental manipulation; and a Reactions Questionnaire (RQ, 
developed for current purposes) assessed various other participant reactions. 
The ESQ was specifically designed to exclude participants who reported a 
history of psychological suffering that may be adversely affected by the experimental 
manipulation. Participants responded by selecting YES or NO to one or more of five 
listed categories (e.g., anxiety disorder). Any item ticked with YES resulted in immediate 
exclusion from the experiment.
The AAQ is a 7-item self-report measure of experiential avoidance (e.g., “I 
worry about not being able to control my feelings”). Participants responded on a 7-point 
Likert scale that ranged from 1 (never true) to 7 (always true). The reported mean for 
the AAQ with a non-clinical student sample is 17.34 (Bond et al., 2011). The mean 
alpha coefficient is .84, and the 3- and 12-month test-retest reliability is .81 and .79, 
respectively.
The VASs were employed as distress ratings of discomfort, anxiety, and stress. 
For example, participants were asked “How much discomfort do you feel right now?” 
They indicated their level of distress on each scale by placing an X on a printed line 
that ranged from 0% (e.g., no discomfort) to 100% (e.g., very much discomfort). 
The RQ comprised four questions that assessed believability, vividness, guilt, and 
distraction regarding the experimental manipulation (e.g., “Please rate how much you 
believe this thought to be true of you”). Participants responded to each scale by placing 
an X on a 16cm line from 0% (e.g., not believable) to 100% (e.g., very believable). See 
Table 1 in Results section for a full list of the questions. The questions in the RQ were 
included in the study to explore whether changes in any of these measures mediated 
outcomes recorded with the interventions on the dependent variables.
Interventions
The aim of the two self-based interventions (distinction self as context and 
hierarchical self as context) was to explore the comparative utility of each in reducing 
experimentally induced distress. Both interventions were brief adaptations of those 
reported by Lucianoet al. (2011), in which defusion techniques assisted participants in 
identifying target thoughts and feelings and then shifting their perspective on these. The 
condition referred to by those researchers as defusion I manipulated the deictic relations 
primarily as distinction relations. In contrast, the condition referred to as defusion II 
manipulated the deictic relations as hierarchical relations. In their focus, both conditions 
appeared to encourage self as context, although each explicitly manipulated different 
relations. Hence, for current purposes, adaptations of these interventions are referred to 
as distinction self as context and hierarchical self as context. 
Distinction self as context. In this condition, participants were presented with 
an intervention similar to Luciano et al’s. (2011) defusion I. The deictic relations of 
I-YOU and HERE-THERE were explicitly enhanced in order to facilitate the distinction 
between self and content. Participants were instructed as follows:
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For this part of the experiment, try to relax yourself in the chair and get comfortable. 
When you’re ready, I want you to close your eyes and just listen to the sound of my 
voice. For now, focus your attention on your breath. Try to feel the rise and fall of 
your stomach with each in-breath and out-breath you take.  Now... just nod if you can 
notice your breathing. Inhale and exhale again and nod if you can notice that you are 
the one who is noticing your breathing. When you are ready, bring your attention to 
the thoughts going through your head in this very instance. Let the thoughts show up, 
whatever kind they are and let them go again. For example, you might be thinking of 
what you did yesterday. Try, if you can, to just notice that you are having this thought, 
observe it, and then let it go again.
Now, pick any one of these thoughts….any thought at all, good or bad will do. When 
you have one, try to imagine that you are taking this thought out of you and writing 
is down on an imaginary piece of paper in front of you. Imagine now that it’s in front 
of you and just watch it…contemplate it as if you were contemplating a painting… 
just try to observe it. 
Now try to think of something that happened last week…notice what is coming into 
your mind. Ask yourself, who is having that memory? Now think of a word that is 
related to the memory… and with this word, do the same thing again…imagine yourself 
taking the word and writing it down. Put it out in front of you and just observe it… 
contemplate it as if you were contemplating a painting. Remember that this is just a 
thought or just a memory…you do not need to do anything with it, just observe it.  
Try to notice that you are here and the thought that you are contemplating is there, 
written in front of you. Again, just notice that it is you who is watching that thought. 
Now imagine how you would feel if you had nothing to eat all day. What feeling or 
sensation would you have? Now imagine that you can see that sensation or feeling of 
emptiness in your stomach. Imagine in your mind’s eye that you can take a picture of 
the emptiness in your stomach and put this picture out in front of you. Do as before, 
just notice this feeling out in front of you, just contemplate it like a painting and when 
you’re ready let it go again.
Now try if you can to focus your attention on the negative thought you wrote down 
earlier in the experiment. Try to write down one word which describes how you feel 
when you have this thought. Maybe it’s sadness…maybe it’s anger… any feeling that 
comes to mind. Then when you are ready, open your eyes and write down that word 
on this piece of paper. Now put the word in the envelope and hand it to me. Closing 
your eyes again, focus your attention once more on that feeling that is in the envelope...
imagine that you can take a picture of this feeling or emotion which is showing up for 
you and imagine placing the picture out in front of you. Now, look at this picture in 
front of you and notice who is looking at this feeling of (word that describes reaction). 
Hierarchical self as context. In this condition, participants were presented with 
an intervention similar to Luciano et al.’s. (2011) defusion II. This intervention varied 
from the distinction self as context condition in that hierarchical relations were targeted 
to provide an even greater distance between self and content. Specifically, participants 
were instructed to see themselves as higher than their psychological content. Participants 
in this group were instructed as follows:
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For this part of the experiment, try to relax yourself in the chair and get comfortable. 
When you’re ready, I want you to close your eyes and just listen to the sound of my 
voice. For now, focus your attention on your breath. Try to feel the rise and fall of 
your stomach with each in-breath and out-breath you take.  Now... just nod if you can 
notice your breathing. Inhale and exhale again and nod if you can notice that you are 
the one who is noticing your breathing. When you are ready, bring your attention to 
the thoughts going through your head in this very instance. Let the thoughts show up, 
whatever kind they are, and let them go again. For example, you might be thinking of 
what you did yesterday. Try, if you can, to just notice that you are having this thought, 
observe it, and then let it go again.
Now, pick any one of these thoughts….any thought at all, good or bad will do. When 
you have one, try to imagine that you are taking this thought out of you and writing 
it down on an imaginary piece of paper in front of you. Imagine now that it’s in front 
of you and just watch it…contemplate it as if you were contemplating a painting… 
just try to observe it. Nod if you can realize that it is you who is contemplating this 
thought? Can you realize that it is you who is watching this thought?
Now try to think of something that happened last week…notice what is coming into 
your mind. Ask yourself, who is having that memory? Now think of a word that is 
related to the memory… and with this word, do the same thing again…imagine yourself 
taking the word and writing it down. Put it out in front of you and just observe it… 
contemplate it as if you were contemplating a painting. Remember that this is just a 
thought or just a memory…you do not need to do anything with it, just observe it.  
Try to notice that you are here and the thought that you are contemplating is there, 
written in front of you. Again, just notice that it is you who is watching that thought. 
Now, try to imagine yourself so big that you can have room for all the thoughts that 
you have had today, for all the sensations, feelings and memories. Now, try to imagine 
yourself as being the captain of a boat and your thoughts and feelings as being the 
passengers. Again, imagine yourself so big that you have room for all of these thoughts 
and feelings. Imagine that your thoughts and feelings are like moles or freckles on 
your body. We all have moles or freckles and we can all walk wherever we want with 
them on our bodies. Imagine that your thoughts and feelings are like moles or freckles 
on your body.  Now nod if you can notice that it is you who is imagining yourself 
with your thoughts and feelings like moles or freckles on your body. Can you see that 
you are more than your moles or freckles? Can you see that you are more than your 
thoughts and feelings?
Now try if you can to focus your attention on the negative thought you wrote down 
earlier in the experiment. Try to write down one word which describes how you feel 
when you have this thought. Maybe it’s sadness… maybe it’s anger… any feeling that 
comes to mind. Then when you are ready, open your eyes and write down that word 
on this piece of paper. Now put the word in the envelope and hand it to me. Closing 
your eyes again, focus your attention once more on that feeling that is in the envelope...
imagine that you can take a picture of this feeling or emotion which is showing up for 
you and imagine placing the picture out in front of you. Now, look at this picture in 
front of you and notice who is looking at this feeling of (word that describes reaction). 
Try to imagine yourself when this (word that describes reaction) is in charge of what 
you do. Take a picture in your mind’s eye of what you do when you let this feeling 
be in charge. Ask yourself who is in charge when you do that? Do you think it is you 
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or your feelings? Now, imagine that you are who is in charge, instead of your (word). 
Imagine, now, that you place yourself over and above your (word). Take a photo of 
what comes to your mind when you see yourself over and above your (word). Try 
to see yourself as being in charge of what you do, instead of your feelings being in 
charge. Now, can you see that you are big enough to have room for any feeling, for any 
(word) and see that they are like moles or freckles and that you are the one in charge?
Procedure
The procedure comprised of seven stages always conducted in the same order. 
Stage 1: Pre-experimental measures. Participants were presented with the ESQ in 
Stage 1. When the exclusion criteria applied, participants were thanked and debriefed. 
All others completed the AAQ and subsequently proceeded to Stage 2.
Stage 2: Baseline VAS ratings. Participants were presented with three VAS ratings 
to assess their baseline subjective ratings of discomfort, anxiety, and stress.
Stage 3: Distress induction task I. The distress induction task involved participants 
writing and saying a negative self-referential thought. All were instructed to think of 
one aspect of themselves they disliked the most. They were then instructed to write 
one sentence in the third person that described this aspect. For example, if a participant 
disliked her weight, she may have written “Ann is fat”. The experimenter then read 
this sentence aloud and the participant was instructed to repeat it. The written sentence 
remained on the table for the duration of the experiment. All participants were presented 
with the following instructions:
Before we begin, I want to explain to you that some of what I will ask you to do in 
this experiment could be difficult for you. I am not going to ask you to disclose any 
personal information, but this task could present you with a considerable emotional 
challenge. At this point, I am not able to tell you what that will be because that 
would defeat the purpose, but I do want to assure you that you will not be made to 
do anything you do not want to do. If, at any point, you feel that you have reached 
your level of distress and want to stop what we are doing, please let me know and 
we will stop immediately. Is that ok with you?  
Participant responds.
Ok, so what I want you to do is try to think of one negative thing about yourself. I 
know this is difficult to do, but I want you to try as hard as you can to think of the 
one thing you really dislike about yourself. When you have this in mind, I want you 
to write it down on that page in front of you. However, I want you to write it from 
someone else’s point of view or in someone else’s words. Do you understand what I 
am asking you to do?
Participant answers.
OK, now in case you have any worries at this stage, I want to assure you that as soon 
as this experiment is over, I will be dumping that page in front of you. So you have 
no need to worry about anything you write on it, is that ok? 
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Participant answers.
OK, so when you’re ready go ahead and write it down there. 
Participant writes the sentence down. 
Ok thank you for doing that. I appreciate that it is probably difficult for you to do. 
Now for the next part I will read out the sentence and I want you to repeat it after 
me. Ok, let’s begin. 
Experimenter says the sentence aloud. 
Participant repeats the sentence.
Stage 4: Post-task VAS and RQ. Immediately after the distress induction task, 
participants were presented with a second set of VASs to determine the potential impact 
of writing and saying the distressing sentence on levels of discomfort, anxiety, and 
stress. Participants also completed the RQ at this time to assess other potential reactions 
to the experimental task. 
Stage 5: Interventions. Participants were randomly allocated to one of the two 
interventions outlined above. Each intervention took approximately 30 minutes to deliver. 
They were both administered by one experimenter who was a trainee ACT therapist and 
was naive to the purpose of the study.
Stage 6: Distress induction task II. Stage 6 involved a second exposure to the 
distress induction task, which involved the experimenter re-reading the written self-
criticism aloud and the participant repeating it.
Stage 7: Post-intervention distress and RQ. Stage 7 was identical to Stage 4, and 
assessed the potential impact of the second self-criticism on discomfort, anxiety, and 
stress, as well as participants’ reactions to the experimental task.
Results
 
The primary aim of the current study was to compare the relative utility of 
the two self-based interventions (distinction versus hierarchical relations) in reducing 
participants’ discomfort, anxiety, and stress after exposure to the distress induction task. 
Participants in both conditions scored within the normal range on the AAQ and did 
not display any pre-experimental differences at baseline with regard to their propensities 
towards avoidance [distinction self as context: M (SD)= 16.2 (6.3); hierarchical self 
as context: M (SD)= 18.2 (6.4)]. This was supported by an independent t-test which 
indicated no significant main effect for condition (p= .37).
The data from the three types of distress ratings were analysed separately and 
are presented below. 
Both conditions recorded similarly low levels of discomfort (<11/100) at baseline 
and increased to the same point after the distress induction (distinction self as context: 
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+12.7; hierarchical self as context: +16.3; see Figure 1). Thereafter, distinction resulted in 
a very small increase in discomfort (+.76), while hierarchy resulted in a decrease (-7.57). 
A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect 
for time [Wilkes Lambda = .53, F (2, 33)= 14.58, p= .000, partial eta squared= .47], 
but not for condition [F (1, 34)= 1, p= .32, partial eta squared= .03]. The interaction 
effect was also non-significant [Wilkes Lambda= .95, [F (2, 33)= .81, p= .45, partial 
eta squared= .05]. Two dependent t-tests investigated which time point was influencing 
the significant effect. The results showed a significant increase in discomfort from 
baseline to post-distress induction (p= .000), but not from post-distress induction to 
post-intervention (p= .31).
Both conditions recorded similarly low levels of anxiety (<10/100) at baseline, 
and both increased at post-distress induction (distinction: +8.06; hierarchy: +13.57; 
see Figure 2). Anxiety subsequently decreased for both conditions, although the larger 
change was recorded for the hierarchical intervention (distinction: -.03; hierarchy: -3.86). 
A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect 
for time [Wilkes Lambda= .54, F (2, 33)= 14.12, p= .000, partial eta squared= .46], 
but not for condition [F (1, 34)= .021, p= .89, partial eta squared= .00]. The interaction 
effect was non-significant [Wilkes Lambda= .94, [F (2, 33)= .1.14, p= .33, partial eta 
squared= .07]. Two dependent t-tests showed a significant increase in anxiety from 
baseline to post-distress induction (p= .000), but not from post-distress induction to 
post-intervention (p= .46).
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Figure 1. Mean VAS discomfort ratings per condition.
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Both conditions recorded low stress (<11/100) at baseline, and both increased at 
post-induction (distinction: +7.43; hierarchy: +9.48; see Figure 3). Thereafter, however, 
distinction resulted in an increase in stress (+4.71), while hierarchy reduced stress (-8.82). 
A mixed between within 3x2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for 
time [Wilkes Lambda= .65, F (2, 33)= 8.74, p= .001, partial eta squared= .35], but not 
for condition [F (1, 34)= .1, p= .76, partial eta squared= .00]. However, the interaction 
was significant [Wilkes Lambda= .83, [F (2, 33)= 3.46, p= .04, partial eta squared= 
.17]. Two dependent t-tests showed a significant increase in stress from baseline to 
post-distress induction for both conditions (both ps <.05). The increase in distinction 
from post-distress induction to post-intervention was not significant (p= .23), but the 
decrease for hierarchy at the same time point was significant (p= .02).
The four reaction questions were collated by condition and time, and the means 
for each are presented in Table 1.
The two conditions recorded high but different levels of believability at post-distress 
induction (see Table 1). However, this decreased in both conditions at post-intervention 
(distinction: -6.64; hierarchy: -12.29). A mixed between within 2x2 ANOVA revealed a 
highly significant main effect for time [Wilkes Lambda= .61, F (1, 34)= 21.55, p=.001, 
partial eta squared= .39], but not for condition or the interaction (both ps >.17).
The two conditions also recorded high but different levels of vividness at post-
distress induction (see Table 1). Both conditions showed a subsequent decrease in vividness 
at post-intervention (distinction: -4.65; hierarchy: -3.06). A mixed between within 2x2 
ANOVA revealed no significant effect for time, condition, or the interaction (all ps >.1). 
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Figure 2. Mean VAS anxiety ratings per condition.
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(see Table 1), and both decreased guilt at post-intervention (distinction: -2.29; hierarchy: 
-5.97). A mixed between within 2x2 ANOVA revealed that the effects for time, condition, 
and the interaction were not significant (all ps >.17). 
Both conditions recorded moderately low levels of distraction at post-distress 
induction (see Table 1), and both decreased at post-intervention (distinction: -8.79; 
hierarchy: -5.76). A mixed between within 2x2 ANOVA revealed a significant effect 
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Figure 1. Mean VAS stress ratings per condition.
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Table 1. Mean RQ ratings by Condition and Time Point. 
Reaction Questionnaire Time 
Distinction 
self as context 
M (SD) 
Hierarchical self as 
context 
M (SD) 
Please rate how believable the 
accident scenario was to you  
Post- 
induction 
55.04  
(37.44) 
73.26 
 (28.56) 
Post-
intervention 
48.4  
(36.3) 
60.97  
(31.24) 
Please rate how vivid your thoughts 
and images were of the car accident  
Post- 
induction 
53.25  
(27.07) 
66.56  
(21.7) 
Post-
intervention 
48.6  
(29.9) 
63.5 
 (27.18) 
Please rate how much guilt you feel 
after saying and writing the sentence  
Post- 
induction 
29.02  
(30.13) 
22.78  
(26.23) 
Post-
intervention 
26.73 
 (29.3) 
16.81 
 (24.75) 
Please rate how much you tried to 
distract from the sentence  
Post- 
induction 
29.15 
 (26) 
23.23  
(20.3) 
Post-
intervention 
20.36  
(22.12) 
17.52 
 (15.45) 
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for time [Wilkes Lambda= .88, F (1, 34)= 4.82, p= .04, partial eta squared= .12], but 
not for the interaction effect or condition (both ps >.49). 
The results demonstrated that the self-criticism task significantly increased 
participants’ levels of discomfort, anxiety, and stress, hence offering an effective method 
of experimental distress-induction for this non-clinical sample. Some differences were 
recorded between the two interventions in terms of their efficacy in reducing the 
dependent measures. Specifically, there was no reduction in discomfort after the distinction 
intervention, although a non-significant reduction was recorded for the hierarchical 
intervention. The same pattern was recorded with anxiety. In contrast, there was an 
increase in stress after the distinction intervention, but a significant reduction after the 
hierarchical intervention. No differences were recorded between the interventions on 
the RQ. However, both were associated with significantly less believability, less guilt, 
less vividness, and significantly less distraction.
discussion
The current research attempted to parse out the effects of distinction versus 
hierarchical relations in a self as context ACT exercise. On the whole, the research was 
a replication of a previous study by Luciano et al. (2011), except that we were able to 
use less intensive interventions with our non-clinical sample. Nonetheless, the superiority 
observed for the hierarchical intervention, relative to distinction, bore some overlap with 
the findings from the original study. One notable difference, however, between the two 
studies concerned the terminology used to describe the core component shared by both 
interventions. That is, we conceptualized these as self as context based interventions, 
while the original authors described these as defusion. 
Two issues are raised by our choice to use the term self as context over defusion. 
First, the current study is part of a larger body of ongoing work that is concerned with 
the role of self in ACT, and is specifically focused on determining potential functional 
distinctions among the original conceptualization of the three selves (e.g., Foody, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2011). Furthermore, the three selves, especially 
self as context, appear to coordinate more readily with RFT than the term defusion. 
Indeed, the research we have conducted to date suggests the potential for an RFT-based 
definition of the three selves. For example, Foody, Barnes-Holmes, and Barnes-Holmes 
(2012) proposed that in self as content your psychological content is coordinated with 
your sense of self because they are both HERE and NOW. Similarly, in self as process, 
content is also coordinated with the self in the HERE and NOW, although the experience 
in this case is on-going. In contrast, the authors proposed that in self as context the 
self or I is HERE and NOW, while the content is THERE-THEN, hence the self and 
content are not coordinated. 
Second, and on balance, it is important to emphasize that the concept of the three 
selves is no less of a middle level term than the concept of defusion, in the sense that 
it is not a laboratory identified process. And, we recognize that there are limits to this 
type of translation exercise in which ACT-based middle level terms are translated into 
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RFT concepts. For us, the ultimate goal is to employ bottom-up RFT terms that will 
be subject to on-going scientific scrutiny and, where possible and useful, to replace 
untestable middle level terms with these more basic and organic scientific processes. 
From that scientific perspective, only bottom-up functional behavioral processes are an 
acceptable unit of investigation and analysis. While top-down concepts are pragmatically, 
heuristically and clinically useful, they have little or no scientific value. 
The hierarchical intervention only resulted in a reduction in all three dependent 
measures, including a significant reduction in stress. This is consistent with Luciano 
et al.’s data (2011), in which the hierarchical intervention (defusion II) resulted in 
a significant reduction in problematic behaviors, along with a significant increase in 
mindfulness and psychological flexibility for the high-risk adolescents. The lack of effect 
for the distinction intervention is also similar to the findings from the original, in which 
Luciano et al. found only limited effects for the defusion I intervention. However, it is 
important to emphasize that there were some procedural differences between the two 
studies (including differences in the length and focus of the interventions) hence there 
are difficulties in drawing parallels between the two.
The current research relied entirely on the potential for the self-criticism to function 
as a distress-induction procedure and the data indicated that it did so very effectively. 
However, it may appear somewhat unusual to attempt to subject the resulting forms of 
distress (i.e., discomfort, anxiety, and stress) to ACT-based interventions, given that ACT 
makes no explicit attempt to reduce one’s emotional content. There remains only limited 
published evidence on individual ACT components and their relative efficacy, and this 
type of componential analysis is best conducted with a tried-and-tested experimental 
preparation. Several existing studies have demonstrated the utility of the self-criticism 
procedure employed here as a robust distress induction tool (e.g., Foody et al., 2011), 
hence it offered one context in which the impact of individual ACT components may 
be observed. Furthermore, although ACT does not explicitly aim to reduce emotional 
distress as a therapeutic aim, it may be the case that this occurs as a by-product of the 
therapeutic techniques.
It was interesting in the current findings to note that the hierarchical intervention 
was significantly effective only in the context of stress, and not in discomfort or anxiety 
(although both of these were also reduced). Indeed, when a non-clinical sample is 
brought into an experimental room and asked to generate a random self-criticism, it 
is unlikely that individuals will provide one that is deeply troubling. In addition, in 
everyday language the word ‘stress’ is used to describe minor or fleeting troubles (e.g., a 
stressful day at college). If participants in the current context generated a recurrent and 
mildly troubling self-criticism, a common reaction they may have to this may be best 
described as stress from their perspective. As a result, the intervention would impact 
more on the stress measure than on the other two.  
In addition to changes in the dependent variables, the data demonstrated that both 
interventions resulted in reductions in the believability, vividness, guilt, and attempts to 
distract, associated with the self-criticism. And both significantly reduced believability and 
distraction. This lack of difference suggests that none of these aspects likely accounted 
for the superiority of hierarhcy over distinction. For example, the hierarchical intervention 
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didn’t work better just by reducing believability more. In any case, all of these outcomes 
for both interventions are consistent with broader ACT aims, for example, to reduce the 
believability of content and the need to distract from it  (Hayes et al., 1999). 
Previous studies have suggested that the types of outcomes recorded here may be 
mediated by levels of emotional distress. For example, Gutiérrez, Luciano, Rodríguez, 
and Fink (2004) found no differences in a “low-pain context” between an ACT versus 
a control intervention on participant’s level of tolerance of pain generated by brief 
electric shocks. However, the efficacy of the interventions differed for the participants 
in the “high-pain context” as 71% of the ACT participants increased in pain tolerance, 
compared to only 11% in the control. In order to explore a similar possibility, we used 
a median split analysis to separate participants who scored high versus low on the 
discomfort, anxiety, and stress ratings at post-induction and then analyzed potential 
differences between the interventions. Although the data indicated no significant 
differences between interventions within either the high or low groups (probably as 
a result of limited statistical power); some interesting differences emerged. That is, 
participants who scored low in discomfort, anxiety, or stress and who were then subject 
to distinction always showed increased distress thereafter. In contrast, participants who 
scored low and who were then subject to hierarchy always showed decreased distress 
thereafter. On the other hand, participants who scored high and who were then subject 
to distinction always showed decreased distress thereafter. Similarly, participants who 
scored high and who were then subject to hierarchy also showed decreased distress, 
although this was considerably larger. In other words, only hierarchy appeared to be 
effective at reducing low levels of distress, while both interventions had some efficacy 
in reducing high levels of distress. These results point to the potential utility of the 
current interventions with a clinical sample.
Naturally, there is a range of methodological limitations within the current work, 
which have implications for future research. As noted above, the dependent variables 
chosen here may have limited applicability in an ACT context, whereas the use of 
a behavioral approach task may be a more appropriate outcome measure as in other 
studies (Gutierrez et al., 2004; Kehoe et al., in press). For example, Kehoe et al., (in 
press) used radiant heat apparatus as the distress induction procedure and this allows 
amount of heat tolerance in time to be measured. Doing so circumvents the reliance on 
self-report measures and supplements the work with more direct measures of functional 
processes. Furthermore, the inclusion of a behavioral task allows for the collection of 
more robust follow-up data than subjective measures as taken at any one point in time. 
This, in turn, potentially demonstrates the stability and generalization of outcomes across 
time and is also a better analogue of what happens in a therapeutic context. 
One might argue that the continued written presence of the target self-criticism 
played a spurious role in the current outcomes. For example, perhaps this exposure 
itself mediated the levels of distress associated with the self-criticism task. Although 
the modest levels recorded across all subjective measures even after distress induction 
appear to support this possibility, on balance all three measures showed significant 
increases after the induction. Similarly, one might argue that this exposure may have 
mediated the effects of the interventions (because the written statement remained present 
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throughout). There is no way to determine if this was the case currently, although this 
methodological feature may be manipulated in future replications. 
One methodological feature of the current study which differs from the original 
by Luciano et al. (2011) is the generation here of only one self-criticism as the distress 
induction procedure. In contrast, the original researchers required participants to generate 
several target thoughts and feelings as part of the intervention. At a methodological level, 
the distress induction procedure may be even more effective if several pieces or types 
of self-referential content were targeted. However, doing so may function as a type of 
exemplar training, which, in and of itself, potentially serves as an intervention. Again, 
future research might explore the potential utility of having multiple self-criticisms, 
while paying attention to their possible influence on selected interventions. 
The current study is among the first to attempt to target specific relational frames 
in the context of ACT exercises. In doing so, it fits the broader research agenda of 
scientific bridge building between ACT and RFT, while recognizing the difficulties 
inherent in the use of middle level terms, such as self as context and defusion. One of 
the central ways forward in dealing with middle level terms is to replace them with 
more functionally sound, empirically tested concepts, such as replacing the terms self 
as context with distinction or hierarchical deictic relations. Although the present study 
is only one small step in that direction, it does suggest that RFT concepts may have 
more clinical application than might have been previously recognized.
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